Gary Schroen (1941–2022)

I rarely put down a book without reading it to the end. This was horrible. Boring. Writing that went nowhere. An attaboy for his old chums still working. His descriptions of everything the CIA were involved as being totally successful, except when the Presidential Administration went against the advice of the Agency go against the grain of even the casual history reader. Schroen is one of those guys who dreams he's a special forces guy and thinks he's elite for picking up their lingo. Schoen hands out cash, lots of it. We now know in 2015 that the cash would have been better spent on our own troops back home in the US.
Gave it a few more chapters after this CIA operative, once he arrived in country (and nearing retirement), described over about a page his bout of diarrhea. Then, my literary self respect took over and moved on to my huge stack of books begging to be read.… (mais)

Schroen writes with a bit of veiled frustration at American policy makers and military leaders who failed at a critical time to take decisive action. As one of the first assets inserted into Afghanistan after 9/11 Schroen was called back from retirement to lead a charge and decisively punish al-Qa'ida. As momentous as the insertion was, and as clear as the goal should be viewed--eliminate those who would kill Americans--the operation at times takes on the appearance of a slap dash movement. By stating this point, it in no ways is intended to detract from the field operatives and the Special Forces Units inserted into Afghanistan. Rather, the White House seemed to throw money and assets at al-Qa'ida and their Taliban hosts hoping for the best as opposed to sufficiently supporting a highly qualified unit of fighting specialists. Despite the best and most courageous of efforts by American special personnel the White House and military planners appear indecisive and overly concerned with political fall-out. The teams sent in, according to Schroen, improvise, use L.L. Bean products, and the teams are not equipped with all the personnel, support, nor the authority to rein vengeance on America's enemies. The time was nigh to act decisively and American policy makers dropped the ball. The enemy noted America's reluctance to sufficiently punish their behavior and took solace in the fact that they could withstand the most that the Americans threw at them. The situation in Afghanistan has degenerated into a long-term, long-war scenario that could have been avoided if policy makers had acted decisively and withdrawn. The fall of Kabul, which occurred after Schroen was removed from the field, eventually arrived, but without eliminating al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. We are paying the price--in blood and treasure--for their ambivalence. The significant miscalculation by Obama is to dramatically escalate the number of troops and cost in Afghanistan, years after 9/11, without any focus and direction. The incredible tactical talents of American Special Forces is undermined by the strategic blunders committed by White House posturing. July 2009 is the deadliest month of the Afghan war for U.S.-led international forces, with the number killed already matching the highest full-month toll of the nearly eight-year conflict, according to figures compiled by The Associated Press. Yet, Schroen demonstrates that the initiative was lost by the U.S. early on to defeat al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.

The closest we got to Obama, according to Schroen, was in the "tribal areas of Pakistan" (p. 362), whereas now we have a better idea that Obama was hiding out in plain site in Abottabad, Pakistan.

By April 2012, the situation has deteriorated to the extent that recent statistics reveal that 69% of the casualties in Afghanistan have occurred during Obama's watch.

Obama’s Watch: 39 Months, 69 Percent of Afghan War Casualties
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-s-watch-39-months-69-percent-afghan-war-ca...… (mais)

Gary Schroen describes his role in the historic events of late 2001 in Northern Afganistan. Leading a team of CIA operatives to coordinate efforts with the Northern Alliance, he struggles with primitive conditions, distrustful Afgans, and mixed signals from American Government agencies. The book moves along at a satisfying pace, taking enough time to fully explain the history of the region from the 1979 Soviet invasion. The book's candor is striking given the recent nature of the events. It is useful from a historic perspective, instructive of current events, and an enjoyable tale of adventure in the tradition of those who serve.… (mais)