Paul W. Westermeyer

This is a short subject work by one of the historians at the History Division of Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. A consequence of this format is a page limit that forced editorial choices that affected the way this story was told. Otherwis this book is pretty much a standard service history with a good selection of maps, combat art, and photographs.

The narrative is presented chronologically. Westermeyer proceeds with a background to the battle to include the political background to the war, the Desert Shield deployments and the reasons for the organization of forces in the al-Khafji area prior to the battle. The author goes into some depth describing the complex Saudi military organization along with a review of Saudi-U.S. military relations. Westermeyer also provides some views from the other side of the hill as he appears to have accessed some translations of material captured from Iraqi official archives in the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom some five years before this book was published.

What makes this account unusual was the sheer variety of units involved in the al-Khafji action--Marine light armored infantry, Marine reconnaissance and surveillance, joint Navy/Marine ANGLICO, Navy SEALs, Saudi National Guard, Saudi MODA, and Qatari, not to mention aviation units. Westermeyer proceeds carefully in his examination of Saudi actions during the battle--other authors have not been as kind in their description of Saudi actions during this battle. However, this being an official history, the kid glove treatment is not unexpected.

What is also not unexpected was the brevity of the coverage of the friendly fire incidents that plagued the Marines during this battle. The destruction of two vehicles and the deaths of 11 Marines due to identification errors and weapons malfunctions did not deserve the short shrift that they received in this book. Atkinson in "Crusade", a much more general history, spends much more time describing this incident. Westermeyer, more than 15 years after the incident, should have spent more effort in the description. It is unfortunate that a Marine historian (or perhaps HQ USMC History Division leadership) chose to minimize this aspect of the al-Khafji battle. After all, one must learn as much or more from the failures as from the successes.… (mais)