Stevenson seeks to explain why the Great War ended like and when it did. Surveying the military situation on land and sea as well, as the economic, industrial, logistic, political and ideological-psychological conditions at home, Stevenson argues that while the Central Powers were in almost every respect worse off in autumn '18 - their armies were retreating, their internal politics more fractious, their manpower reserves more depleted, their economies closer to collapse, and their populations closer to starvation (at it, in parts of Austria and Turkey) - the immediate reason for the war to end in November was psychological, leaders, soldiers and civilians having lost hope that fighting on might improve matters.

About three months ago, after studying an excellent program by Coursera.org on modern global history, I decided to read a number of books on WWl. I began with Tuchman's "Guns of August"(detailing the first month of the War), then read Clark's "the Sleepwalkers" which examined the major causes of WWl and the critical history leading up to June, 1914. Both were excellent, 5 star efforts, well researched and well written. I also obtained a copy of MacMillan's "Paris 1919", which covers the Treaty formalizing the closing of the War, and I'll read that in the near future. Those of you familiar with WWl realize that the years between late 1914 and early 1918 were consumed by battles along the Western and Eastern Fronts, mostly trench warfare, with incredibly huge numbers of casualties and little advance by either side. Significant change takes place in 1918 when Germany launches the first of a series of major attacks, followed by counter movement by the Allies, all leading to the Armistice of November 1918 and the end of the War. There are a number of books focusing on that final year of the War and I chose to read "With Our Backs to the Wall" - which I now regret.

My major criticism of "With Our Backs to the Wall" is with the writing. I found it to be incredibly dull. There is little in the way of story-telling here, with no emotion, no sense of the commitment, suffering and loss that soldiers and those at home endured for years during the war and beyond. Instead, the reader is bombarded with long, excessively wordy paragraphs that go on and on and on. Battles and numbers of everything are itemized including the number of horses killed, or planes of each country at the start of a battle and the number shot down, without any sense of what a dogfight in World War One was like. Reading this for me was reminiscent of my grade school history texts of fifty years ago, books that turned me off to history for years. If there was a theme here, it was not at all clear to me.

Too often, numbers in "With Our Back to the Wall" were packed into the text like sardines. The following is from page 386 in the paperbound edition, in a section dealing with The War Economies, England: "A generation earlier, output also slipped: from 287.4 million tons in 1913 to 265.7 million in 1914, 253.2 million in 1915, 256.4 million in 1916, 248.5 million in 1917, and 22.7 million in 1918. In addition, the coal became 'dirtier', the element of stone and shale doubling to more than 10 per cent, and productivity, as measured by tons per man per shift, dropped to 4 per cent below the 1913 level in 1917 and 6 per cent below in 1918. Unlike munitions, steel, or the railways, the mines were dogged by labour unrest, 134 disputes between January and November 1918 involving 356,000 workers and costing 1,081,000 working days."

The above quote comprised all or parts of eleven lines from a forty-two line paragraph. By itself, it may not appear too bad to someone reading this review. But try imagining page after page of numbers, numbers, trees, trees - without a step back to look at the forest. Here are a few sentences regarding a battle in the Balkans (page 145): "As of June 1918 the Allies had 200 serviceable aircraft against 80; 2,000 large and medium-calibre guns against 1,800; and 284 infantry battalions to 254, which on paper meant 600,000 to 450,000 men, although because of the large size of Bulgarian infantry companies the true ratio was less favorable. On the Moglena sector, however, the Franco-Serb forces achieved a 3:1 superiority of 75 battalions against 26 (36,500 infantrymen against 11,600); 580 guns against 146; 756 machine guns against 245; and 81 aircraft against 24."

The first third of the book deals with the battles of the time period (1918). The last two thirds cover various critical topics, covering the strengths and weaknesses of the major participants, including logistics, technology, manpower, morale, subs, shipping, production, the home front. Some interesting points were made here, particularly with the use of women in the work force. But other items I felt should have been covered in more detail, including atrocities against civilians and the flu epidemic. While there were stats covering the number of war dead by country scattered here and there throughout the book, I thought it would have been productive to bring that all together for the reader in a conclusion showing the contribution by country, percentage of populace etc.

In fairness to the author, I note that 14 of 16 Amazon reviewers scored this 4 out of 5 stars. Incredible! If you are seriously considering reading this book despite my comments and 1 star rating, I suggest you stop at your local bookstore, find a comfortable chair and read a dozen pages or so. This is a 545 pager, and a huge investment of your time. If you do road test this consider pages 245-255 on the contributions of the American Expeditionary Force. Another reviewer suggested John Toland's "No Man's Land" as an alternative; I have bought a copy via Amazon and will read it soon. ( )

I don't often hand out five stars to a book but this magisterial examination of why the Great War ended when it did is one of those times. Stevenson takes you from the last great offensives of the Central Powers, thru the Entente military response, to a systematic survey of how the various powers handled the military, economic, social, managerial, and political aspects of their wars; I'm hard pressed to imagine that any but the most well-read specialists on World War I won't get something out of this work.

So, how does Stevenson answer the question of why the armistice happened on November 11, 1918? While the rot was well underway in terms of the war-time economies of all the major powers the somewhat surprising answer is that final domino was that of Bulgaria accepting a ceasefire in September of 1918. Why Bulgaria? In part this was the signal to the knowledgeable German leadership that the time had come to ask for a ceasefire themselves, because they did recognize that victory had ceased to be an option and that the loss of Bulgaria meant being cut off from the Romanian oil needed to fuel the German military. From there it was race between agreement and revolution.

One will also come away from this book with new respect for the Entente leadership, as for all their mistakes it can be demonstrated that men like Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Wilson played their cards better then did Wilhelm II, Erich Ludendorff, and the like. In particular, an astute leadership of the Central Powers would, in Stevenson's opinion, have sued for peace on the basis of Wilson's 14 Points in April of 1918. An even more sensible German leadership would not have goaded Woodrow Wilson into the war in 1917. Of course, astute leadership is not what the Imperial Germany of Wilhelm II is famous for.

As for the Entente, Stevenson can note that it was perhaps unfortunate that the war did not continue a week or two longer, as that it would have made it obvious that Germany had reached a point of military bankruptcy, and that there was no "stab in the back" leading to defeat. This is the difference between a coalition being clear on what their minimal demands were, and a government that never had a clear grasp of what constituted a viable strategy. ( )

As a first remark, I have to say that what David Stevenson doesn't know about 1918 isn't worth knowing. His grasp of the subject is really impressive.
The main question of the book is why the armistice came end 1918 when it did, and sooner or later. The Allies were fully convinced that the war could only be won by a great spring offensive in 1919 at the earliest.
Stevenson gives his answer in an extensive analysis. The military events are dealt with succinctly and competently. However, if you are looking for a detailed account of the fighting, you'll have to look elsewhere. He really comes into his own analysing the broad background of the war: politics, manpower questions, industrial production, agriculture, transport, finance, logistics, morale... Both sides were clearly at the end of their tether in 1918, and David Stevenson shows how they tried to deal with a succession of interlocking crises.
An interesting thought here is that while the Central Powers were essentially run by a military dictatorship that allowed no interference in their plans, the victorious Allies were all parliamentary democracies, run by left-wing politicians who asserted the primacy of civilian politics over military operations. Russia, the Allied power who tried to impose an autocratic system also collapsed spectacularly. ( )

New release by David Stevenson. Well written and researched. This work deals with an analysis of the last several months of the First World War. It looks not only at the results from the battlefield starting with the March 21, 1918 German offensive, but also studies such variables as military intelligence, technology, logistics, manpower, morale, leadership, gender issues, class, etc. Each of these areas are reviewed from the view of the Allies vs the Central Powers, the individual countries, as well by looking at the leaders of the nations and their relative style and ability.

Both sides in the war made serious errors. Both sides toward the end were running out of manpower and resources. Dr. Stevenson explores what factors made the Allies the winners, and conversely why the Central Powers lost, caving in during the last months in 1918.

As I have said in other book reviews, it is easy to get lost among all the abbreviations for agencis, committees, groups, etc. I had to go back into the book to refresh myself on what the abbreviations stood for and what the agency was charged with accomplishing. Conveniently, the author includes a list of abbreviations on ppgs. x-xiii.

All that aside, I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in WWI, particularly those interested in the background to the war's conclusion beyond the battlefield results. There is more to the story than that, and Dr. Stevenson does a fine job of presenting that side of the conflict. Rather long: 545 pages of text, plus notes, bibliography and index totalling 688 pages. Well worth the time to go through it all. ( )