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A carregar... Plato: The Sophist [Translation]por Plato
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Plato's Sophist provides a careful translation of the Sophist, one of Plato's most complex and difficult dialogues, and includes materials designed to facilitate its usefulness as a text in college courses. The translation employs a minimum of interpretative paraphrasing while being presented in clear, readable English. Special attention has been given to consistency in translating key Greek terms. The book presents a special list of these terms and discusses them in the endnotes. The result is a translation that enables the reader who lacks a knowledge of Greek to get much closer than usual to the original text. Cobb's introduction contains a detailed summary of the entire dialogue, clarifying the main themes and the general structure. He offers a fresh interpretation of the dialogue that shows how each theme contributes to the exploration of the nature of, and the relation between, philosophy and sophistry. The introduction is particularly useful to first readers of the Sophist. Não foram encontradas descrições de bibliotecas. |
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Google Books — A carregar... GénerosSistema Decimal de Melvil (DDC)184Philosophy and Psychology Ancient, medieval and eastern philosophy PlatonicClassificação da Biblioteca do Congresso dos EUA (LCC)AvaliaçãoMédia:
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Primary among these problems was confusion about being (i.e. the word “is”) and manipulation of the confusion of “is” as denoting existence with its denoting a thing’s having particular qualities. With this difference long clear to us, it’s hard to understand how the brightest minds in ancient Greece were stumped by it, but it was a major problem that Plato seems to have effectively clarified in Sophist. Another main problem in sophistical arguments was the equation of “not being x” with “being the opposite of x.” Plato pretty effectively clarifies that “not” indicates difference but not necessarily contrariety. He also, very importantly, believes he establishes that we can talk about things that don’t exist without necessarily contradicting ourselves. I’m not sure he established this in a way that would decisively undermine the sophists, but this issue was central to Plato’s problem with them. Some sophists claimed there couldn’t be false belief or speech because no one could think or say “that which is not” since “that which is not” has no share in “being” (this picks up an issue from the Theaetetus, while Sophist in general is largely directed against Parmenides, with some mostly indirect connection to the dialogue named after him). We might say that Plato demonstrated, or believed he demonstrated, that at least some things which don’t exist (e.g. things that are false) are nevertheless available to thought and speech.
Another main issue Plato tackles, also without the greatest clarity, is that qualities (possibly the Forms or Ideas from his earlier works) can blend with each other (this revisits a central problem from the Parmenides, at least if we take it as dealing with the Forms). He doesn’t provide much of an account of how this works, but in a proto-Aristotelian manner he doesn’t seem to need to so he doesn’t bother; he gives some examples which appear to adequately demonstrate that this “blending” happens in at least some situations and then forgoes further proof as he’s achieved his primary objectives: demonstrating that things can either “be” in the sense that they exist or they can “be” possessors of qualities; they can “not be” in possession of quality x but this doesn’t mean they have (or are) its opposite; they can “not be” something without meaning they don’t exist; we can discuss things that “are not” without contradicting ourselves or saying nothing; and things can possess a multiplicity of differing qualities, “blending with each other,” without this being inherently contradictory or problematic. At least this is my understanding of what I take to be the main points of the dialogue. (The first third of the book is an entertaining search for a definition of “sophist,” in which we also meet the Eleatic Visitor and are introduced to his “method of division.”)
The Visitor seems to speak for Plato much more clearly than the character Socrates elsewhere, and it’s hard to imagine Plato taking on the tasks of this dialogue with the usual Socratic limitations and dialectical method. Decisively refuting the sophists on the points addressed was critical to Plato’s project (there is truth, it’s absolute and unchanging, and it very possibly can be discovered and understood by man; there also must be falsehood – both deceit and misunderstanding or ignorance; similarly, justice and knowledge are real, and attempting to pursue and understand them is not necessarily destined to be fruitless). But we also find the Visitor as the main speaker in Statesman, while Parmenides had been the main speaker in that dialogue (with a young Socrates largely on the defensive), and Socrates doesn’t even appear in The Laws. Timaeus and Critias are essentially monologues by those characters, and even in Philebus, with Socrates as the main speaker, he asserts positive doctrine rather than questioning others and demolishing their definitions and arguments. It seems Plato in his late period needed something his earlier Socratic character and method could no longer provide him (with the exception of the Theaetetus, perhaps acting as a coda for the old Socrates and an introduction to the trilogy which apparently was to include Sophist, Statesman, and the unwritten Philosopher).
I mentioned a proto-Aristotelian aspect in this dialogue; it seems there are several of these in the Parmenides and Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman trilogy: The logic puzzles in Parmenides almost demand an analysis and categorization of logical fallacies, for which a formal logic would be a prerequisite. The Eleatic Visitor’s method of division (used in Sophist and Statesman) is a step away from Socratic dialectic and a step towards Aristotelian logic. The Visitor also insists on differentiation between general and specific, and seems to be moving towards something like Aristotle’s genus and species. The unmoved mover makes a very brief appearance in Statesman’s cosmological myth, which also includes something like an initial abstract of Aristotle’s Politics (i.e. a survey and critique of existing political systems). And there’s also something similar to Aristotle’s beloved doctrine of the mean in Statesman. To be fair to Aristotle, no one else in the Academy took these hints or produced the remarkable body of work he did, and there are plenty of things in Aristotle, e.g. his causality, which don’t seem to have any obvious precedents in Plato. Certainly Aristotle’s formal logic was one of history’s great intellectual achievements, regardless of the extent of the foundation Plato provided. And of course the mindsets of the two men were very different, not least in the place (or lack thereof) of empiricism in their respective worlds of thought.
Perhaps it should be noted that our view of the sophists may be excessively negative and otherwise unbalanced largely due to Plato’s well-preserved and brilliant dialogues which so often savage the group. It’s unlikely we’ll ever have adequate knowledge of them to be able to independently assess Plato’s characterizations. But perhaps it’s worth keeping in mind Plato’s harsh view of the poets, who we do know, when considering his even harsher view of the sophists. ( )