James Hornfischer was justly esteemed as a naval historian and his analysis of the Marianas Campaign is up to his best work. Where I think this book is somewhat less successful is when Hornfischer decides to address the end game in the Pacific War, which the campaign was fought to facilitate, and examine the American strategic bombing assault against Japan, culminating in the use of atomic weapons.

Hornfischer concludes that the psychological mindset of the Japanese leadership was the ultimate center of gravity in the war, justifying the use of the worst weapons we had available to break the deadlock that paralyzed the Japanese government's power of decision. In some ways I'm more convinced of this argument than I might have been, say, ten years ago, as I've become much more aware of weaknesses of the Meiji State that allowed the Japanese military to arrogate too much authority. Still, there are times when Hornfischer doesn't seem like he convinces himself with his own argument, as accepting the principles of Total War is an acceptance of the overthrow of all the restrains that aim to maintain proportionality; sometimes ugly is just ugly.

However, I also think those who argued that Hiroshima was really the opening shot of the Soviet-American Cold War, and that this foreclosed a better relationship with Stalin were/are kidding themselves; though that's an argument for another day. Still, to give those folks their due, I have to accept that there's an element of the U.S. government sleep-walking their own way through the decision making process which sticks with me from all that I've read about it. The American choice to use atomic weapons was as riddled with second guessing, sloppy thinking, and self-serving careerism as the Japanese process of avoiding national suicide. This is a long-winded way of saying that FDR was derelict in preparing Truman to preside over the final decision, and even if the right decision was ultimately made, it is not very satisfying. Overall, I still prefer Richard Frank's "Downfall" as an examination of the 1945 endgame, though Hornfischer takes into account Harold Bix's "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan," which ascribed much more political culpability to the Japanese sovereign than had been done previously. I suppose I'm arguing that another parallel examination of American and Japanese decision-making processes might be in order; hopefully Richard Frank completes his new trilogy about World War II viewed through the filter of the Sino-Japanese war. ( )

Overall, it was a good book that would have been more interesting to me 25 years ago, as it is now a repeat and conglomeration of books I have read over the years.

It was well written, factual with good notes, and had good maps.

The narrative starts with the Marianas Campaign and concludes at war's end. It has good detail and endeavors to tell stories of individual outside of the beaten path, so to speak.

It is a good book and well worth reading by the beginner or intermediate reader. ( )

I've enjoyed Hornfisher's [b:Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal|8575701|Neptune's Inferno The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal|James D. Hornfischer|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1320403084s/8575701.jpg|13444597] but not [b:Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR's Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors|31751|Ship of Ghosts The Story of the USS Houston, FDR's Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors|James D. Hornfischer|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1400116596s/31751.jpg|31967] so I was glad this was more on par with the former. A good history of the invasion of Saipan in 1944. I understand that one of the main reasons for invading Saipan was to build bomber bases there, but that seems taking the story a bit too far to then continue this book until the end of the war on that basis. I wish Hornfisher would have stopped after Saipan - or spent as much time on the Guam and Tinan invasions as he did with Saipan. There are some great character sketches here - and some that just scratch the surface that could have been so much more. I think Hornfisher is a good historian and I'll read more of his work if it comes around, but I also think this story goes too long and strays off task. ( )

Let me just start with this probably being Hornfischer’s best book so far. I have been fairly critical of his previous books, and I’m not totally going to let go but I find this a good improvement.

This book covers 1944-1946, when the American military had the upper hand in the war in the Pacific, but every step was risky, a single bomb could kill thousands, and island invasions cost life for every meter gained on a map.

My criticism in the past has been that books that portray themselves as historical books have neglected to look at the events and actions from multiple angles and instead seemingly decided to go on a non-critical path where very little is second guessed. They have also seemingly relied heavily on a few sources, of which few, or none, were Japanese.

This book is better. It actually mixes the story of how Americans attack pacific islands with commentary from people, Japanese, civilians and military who occupied those islands at the time. This greatly enhances the narration from a historical point of view. There is still, in my mind, too little of letting multiple angles show in questions where there is no black or white answer, but this is a clear improvement.

Not mixing in disagreeing voices in the narration probably makes the book easier to read and follow, but I, who cares less about heroism and more about the ethical dilemmas and the hard choices, would have liked a little bit more of a deep analysis.

The biggest question is, and will probably always be, was it right to explode two atomic weapons over Japan, killing between 130,000 and 230,000 people, mostly civilians. In this question the book comes down strongly on the ”yes, it was the best for everyone involved” side. With some merit it claims that the alternative would have resulted in more dead Japanese and more dead Americans. We will never know but the argument in the book is persuasive.

The book follows a handful of characters more closely. Raymond Spruance, the admiral who oversaw most of the action on the spot, Paul Tibbets, the commander of Enola Gay and the division of B-29:s who was going to deliver nuclear weapons. Draper Kauffman, the man who headed UDT, the group that is the precursor of the navy SEALs.

Of the three main characters Spruance is the most interesting, but also the most secretive. To him the war seemed to be an intellectual exercise rather than a physical or emotional exercise. He was clearly overshadowed by people with much large egos and much more aware of their public image. Douglas MacArthur, Halsey, Mitchell, Nimitz, King, and so on. It is easy to feel like Spruance didn’t get all the credit he deserved, but on the other hand, he didn’t seem bitter in any way about it.

The book also talks about the cultural clash between the marine corps and the army. Not in any depth, and to an outsider, having two “armies” seems a bit strange so I would not have minded some background to why the US military has more than one. In the end, the Pacific war became good PR for the marine corps. Nobody could throw themselves on a meat grinder as effectively as a marine corps solder.

All in all, of James D. Hornfischer's books, this is not the most interesting story, but it's the best told story. ( )

James Hornfischer may be the outstanding historian of the U.S. Navy's Pacific war in World War II. With this volume he takes the reader from the conquest of the Mariana Islands through the atomic bombings and the end of the war. His writing style reads like a novel and his attention to detail, when necessary, is breathtaking. Although the title was indicates that the book is dedicated to documenting the USN, it is much more. Throughout the narrative, he weaves in the story of Paul Tibbets and the B-29'bombing campaign in general. His admiration of Raymond Spruance is clear and, in truth, Spruance deserves greater acclaim than his more flamboyant colleague, William Halsey. Finally, better than any author I have read, he explains the psychological impact of the Japanese determination to die, even if it meant the end of the nation. To this degree, his narrative of the end of the war is superior to Richard Frank's book "Downfall." He does a better job of explaining why it was necessary to use the atomic bombs than virtually any other author who has covered the same material. ( )