"The Worst Case considers how the Cold War and its shape as a strategic confrontation between two superpowers flowed from the Korean War. The book examines the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, each superpower's relations with its allies, and the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in the decisions of the key nations. The United States reluctantly funded massive increases in nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines because the leaders of the Truman administration concluded that Stalin was prepared to start World War III to advance his interests in Asia and Europe. In the absence of any reliable intelligence on Soviet or Chinese decision-making, the key people in the administration accepted the worst case as a real possibility, and prepared for it. What they did not know is that Stalin was working consistently to avoid war with the United States, that Mao was not a puppet of Moscow but had his own ambitious agenda in Asia, and that Kim Il-sung had convinced Stalin that he could produce a low-cost victory in Korea that would give the Soviet Union warm-water ports and a reliable client state strategically positioned to influence Japan and the states of Southeast Asia. Through materials from archives and previously restricted published materials in Russia, China, and North Korea that have become accessible in recent years, The Worst Case provides insights into the reasons behind choices made by leaders in the communist countries to add to the well-researched records on the Western side"--