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von, C: On War por Carl von Clausewitz
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von, C: On War (original 1832; edição 1992)

por Carl von Clausewitz (Autor), Carl von Clausewitz (Autor), Michael Howard (Autor)

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On War is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in 1832, it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.… (mais)
Título:von, C: On War
Autores:Carl von Clausewitz (Autor)
Outros autores:Carl von Clausewitz (Autor), Michael Howard (Autor)
Informação:University Press Group (1992), Edition: Reprint, 752 pages
Colecções:A sua biblioteca

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On War por Carl von Clausewitz (1832)

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    A History of Warfare por John Keegan (Cecrow)
    Cecrow: Keegan engages with Clausewitz and challenges him on a number of points.
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Clausewitz was intrigued by how the leaders of the French Revolution, especially Napoleon, changed the conduct of war through their ability to motivate the population and gain access to all state resources, triggering war on a larger scale than ever before. Clausewitz believed that the moral forces in battle had a great influence on its outcome. He was a professional soldier who spent a considerable part of his life fighting Napoleon. The insights he gained from his political and military experiences, combined with a solid understanding of European history, provided the basis for this work.

A wealth of historical examples are used to illustrate his various ideas. Napoleon and Frederick the Great stand out for having made very efficient use of the terrain, movement and forces at their disposal.

Clausewitz argues that the theory of war cannot be a strict operating council for generals. Instead, he wanted to highlight the general principles that would result from the study of history and logical thinking. Military campaigns could only be planned to a very small degree, because incalculable influences or events, so-called attrition, would quickly make any detailed planning obsolete in advance. Military leaders must be able to make decisions under time pressure with incomplete information, since, in his opinion, "three-quarters of the things on which action is based in war" are hidden and distorted by the fog of war.

He gradually went from a more existential idea of ​​war to imagining it as the highest form of self-assertion of a people, and years later concluded that war was a mere instrument: "Therefore, war is an act of violence for impose our will on the enemy."

Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along categories such as Purpose, Goal, and Mean. He reasoned that violence is the means to impose our will on the enemy and, to achieve this end, the enemy must be disarmed, which is the objective of war operations. The Goal is pursued with the help of a strategy, which can be carried out in various ways, such as the defeat or elimination of the opposing armed forces or by non-military means (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state can serve as a means to achieve the defined goal.

One of Clausewitz's best-known quotes sums up this idea: "War is a mere continuation of politics by other means." ( )
  Marcos_Augusto | Aug 15, 2021 |
Tratado acerca de la teoría de la guerra: por qué se produce, su fin y sus medios, cuándo y cómo, su necesidad o innecesariedad, su naturaleza, las cualidades del militar... Muchas cosas se aprenden en él que se pueden aplicar a la vida diaria. ( )
  Eucalafio | Oct 18, 2020 |
My first full reading of Clausewitz (accepting that the Penguin volume does not include several books on early nineteenth-century military operations) impressed upon me the essence of philosophy and theory as it applies to the social sciences. This Penguin volume is interesting in that it includes an introduction from the editor of the 1908 version used by the US military (Colonel F.N. Maude) and a later introduction from the time of the Cold War (1966 and the early stages of the Vietnam War) by Professor Anatol Rapoport. I have long viewed On War much the same as one might Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: the quote “war is the continuation of policy by other means” proving to be as similarly unhelpful “as if by an invisible hand” in comprehending the extent of the philosophical grounding in store for the avid reader of classic literature. Reading Clausewitz is like reading John Stuart Mill: almost every lesson is so ingrained in the education of political scientists (or in this case, from my training as an army officer) that it seems like nothing new. From morale being one third of combat power (p. 424) to the implied role of the infantry (which I memorised years ago and can still recite), to the essence of war and the changes heralded by the Napoleonic period to the future of absolute or total war that would arrive in 1914, these things I mostly knew. But the references to philosophy (the Stoic’s negative visualisation gets a run), to how to develop a theory, to the social scientific view of the world that is largely inductive (and unfalsifiable if one is a fan of Karl Popper) astounded me. That I could learn so much unexpectedly was a blessing. Some ideas are worth noting. First, in the introduction, Rapoport writes of Clausewitz (p. 72):Those without specialized mathematical knowledge (e.g. political scientists, administrators, military men) tend to conceive of their expertise as that of the artist rather than of a scientist. Rapoport explains (p. 431):In the exact sciences, theory is used precisely in the sense rejected by Clausewitz, namely, in the sense of a collection of theorems deduced rigorously from postulates formulated in ‘if so… then so” terms, i.e. as formulas. Clausewitz here uses ‘theory’ in the sense often used in the social sciences, namely, as a synthesis of concepts which illuminate the subject matter without necessarily enabling us to make specific predictions or to control specific situations.This was illuminating, given that only today I was rummaging through the inductive nature of my own theories developed from research and then reading of Popper’s critique of historicism (another discussion that is new to me). An interesting reference from the notes is one of what was probably the most outdated books of the twentieth century even before it was published: Cavalry in Future Wars written in 1908. Rapoport argues that by then, cavalry in its traditional form had no future (Henry Chauvel aside). Finally, Clausewitz subordinates the military to the political without diminishing what he considered to be its noble qualities:In one word, the Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes.Clausewitz frequently argues that the Art of War can only be learnt through practice. While policy-makers might best be suited to determining the aim of war (as policy) from book-learning, military commanders could never attain the artistic qualities necessary for successful military campaigning without direct experience of the fog of war. As I have recently moved into research that involves practitioners, Clausewitz gives me some hope for my theoretical aspirations and the use of induction in my work. This was a wonderful surprise, a circumstance that often repeats itself when I embark on a cover to cover reading of books that I thought I knew. I must admit that this is the second volume of this work I have purchased. When the first arrived and I discovered it was an abridged version, I donated it to my local library. When this book arrived (Penguin classics are ‘unabridged’ – this version is unabridged from the 1908 abridged version), I was disappointed but pushed on out of frustration. I must say it was worth it and I will be recommending this as a reading project for others in my field who, like me, might also think they know Clausewitz. ( )
1 vote madepercy | Oct 10, 2018 |
O como un libro revolucionario en su epoca se vuelve un dogma que termina cristalizando y generando grandes problemas. Resulta interesante pero basado mucho en las campañas y conclusiones de federico el grande y napoleon, y en ese sentido algo pasado de moda ( )
  gneoflavio | Nov 30, 2016 |
The ultimate classic on strategy, which is timeless, and tactics, which may be for the 19th-century but contain elements that are eternal..
  librisissimo | Oct 15, 2016 |
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Nome do autorPapelTipo de autorObra?Estado
Carl von Clausewitzautor principaltodas as ediçõescalculated
Brodie, BernardIntroduçãoautor secundárioalgumas ediçõesconfirmado
Graham, Colonel J. J.Tradutorautor secundárioalgumas ediçõesconfirmado
Howard, Michael EliotEditorautor secundárioalgumas ediçõesconfirmado
Maude, Colonel F. N.Introduçãoautor secundárioalgumas ediçõesconfirmado
Paret, PeterTradutorautor secundárioalgumas ediçõesconfirmado
Raroport, AnatolEditorautor secundárioalgumas ediçõesconfirmado
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We propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations—therefore to advance from the simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts their relation to the whole should be kept constantly in view.
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It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until the time of action is past.
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On War is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in 1832, it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.

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355 — Social Sciences Public Administration, Military Science Military Science

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