When the investigation muddies the subject.

The pressing question, "What is to be done with the Germans," is a rephrasing of that other notorious German Question. Note that in 1945 history has not yet settled out so smoothly. The German Solution is still on the table, and it is with a sense of this adrenaline-dread moment that Jaspers' work on Guilt should be understood. That is, if we are to come into an understanding of its primary function as an exculpatory project.

The four categories put forth by Jaspers are particularly muddled. In contrast with what appears to be the impression of many readers, they are not a very useful scaffold for the discussion of guilt. If we are more attentive, we find that in Jaspers' work there are, in fact, only two categories: the Guilty and the Not-Guilty, and Jaspers is interested in delimiting these categories as strongly as possible.

On the Guilty Category (Criminal Guilt)
If we acknowledge that the Reich's apparatus made such acts non-criminal and instead judge on the basis of, "natural law and international law, if not the positive law in force at the time in one’s own country," then we can easily condemn those who operated the killing fields and everyone up the chain. Though Jaspers appears to be begging the question with his assumption that criminal acts can be straightforwardly delimited and tried, such that he has already separated the guilty from the not-guilty before the discussion has begun. ("What about the auxiliary units without which the function of the death squads would not have been possible, and those who made denouncements with knowledge of what would happen, and those who appropriated property and still possess it..." "What about those Einsatzgruppen members and camp guards who only carried out orders due to compulsion on penalty of death and those officers who did the same, and those commanders who did the same...") (Within a year of the publication of this text, the Nuremburg trials will already have shown Jaspers' approach to be outdated.) The omission of so-called "marginal cases" would be striking if we did not understand that the objective is the delimitation of the Einsatzgruppen from the German. Jaspers is also aware his definition of "natural law" implicates the Allied bombing of Dresden and other acts of Total War, and we might notice that he subsequently pardons these acts with the implication that neither side is in the position to be inquiring after skeletons in closets.

On the Not-Guilty Categories
The remaining categories are for those who "have already been punished enough." Political guilt: for victims of circumstance. Moral guilt: a self-condemnation which is already its own punishment. Metaphysical guilt: the only necessary deutero-category: an explicitly exculpatory category which exists to explain the suspicions of guilt which persist despite, in Jaspers' opinion, not being guilty in the strict sense. That the Holocaust requires an unprecedented framework for the judgment of those, such as Eichmann, who could not even do violence to another body, yet arranged the deaths of millions, remains an open question. In a sense, the text appears to be an artifact of pre-war ideology. Hannah Arendt would remark, in her comments on the Eichmann trial, the paradoxical fact that as responsibility for mass-killings increased, one became by degrees more abstracted from the violence of the killing fields.

(I will remark here, in passing, the framework for a slightly more robust scheme for the discussion of guilt based on Jaspers' priors. It seems he would like to categorize guilt according to two dipoles: first, that of 'accomplished' actions which have occurred versus 'speculative' actions which have not occurred but could have, and, second, that of 'definite' processes which are the (almost) certain consequences of actions versus 'aleatory' processes which are not guaranteed consequences. If we imagine a 2x2 grid, Jaspers would consider guilty all 'accomplished' and 'definite' actions, such as executing someone with a firearm and signing paperwork authorizing the execution. All 'accomplished' and 'aleatory' actions, such as cooking food for the executioner, are 'not guilty.' All 'speculative' and 'definite' actions, such as not having intervened to fire upon the executioner, are 'not guilty.' All 'speculative' and 'aleatory' actions, such as not having been more politically active against the executioner's party, are 'not guilty.' This clarifies the discussion without as many redundant categories, but also highlights the problemata involved in the judgment of marginal cases (Is the camp guard performing a 'definite' or 'aleatory' action when, although he does nothing, by his presence prevents the escape attempt of a would-be victim...).) (The concept of 'speculative'-'aleatory' action as a viable criterion for guilt is the basis of an interesting discussion to be had regarding the quality of guilt/sin as "luxury dissolved into the atmosphere," now with particular reference to the climate emergency as tragedy of the commons and the doctrine of original sin with respect to consumption and desire. Either way, it is clear those who so readily condemn 'speculative' actions for others are not quite aware of the portentous weight of opening this category up to the guilt-judgment.)


What is to be done with the German People
The text has a response for readers, both the Non-German and the German. For the Non-German, the text is meant to address the (not uncommon) sentiment that the German people, as a whole, are guilty (mostly as aggressors and initiators of the world war). Though perhaps correct that the German people are not much worse than any other, the urgency of this proof produces some contortions. The ready employment of the "master-slave dialectic" demonstrates that, in confronting and disarming the Germans, we are actually making them nobler, stronger: "The decision to stay alive in impotence and servitude is an act of life-building sincerity." The, ironic, implication being that you would really punish the Germans by allowing re-unification and re-armament, which would therefore make them worse. The consideration of the possibility that the United States could become a fascist autarchy, which some readers have remarked as prescient, is merely the logically necessary argument for German re-armament to "disrupt the emerging US-USSR dipole," which does not appear to be an uncommon sentiment, even at the time.

For the German, the message is one of upbuilding. First, by exculpating the German from the guilt of the war, Jaspers permits a recognition of the past, which the German, aware of his likely guilt, does not even begin to recognize. This is probably a good thing. For those who are able to at least get that far, Jaspers would like them to made into productive, liberal citizens, acting to better the world in cognizance of sublimation of the guilt associated with living under the Reich.

But perhaps he goes a bit too far in the practice of sage burning, because we can sense an opening of Jaspers up into a reading of Deleuze, with consequences Jaspers might shrink from. If we are not to punish the fulminant anti-Semite simply because he hasn't killed anyone, why should we proceed with the punishment of the so-called "criminally guilty" who are now disarmed and unlikely to become recidivists. If punishment does not prevent a future crime, nor act as a form of restitution, should we not also refrain here as well (especially in light of the consequences of the Nuremburg trials in which many in Jaspers' "criminally guilty" category were also found to be not-guilty), and with recognition of the carceral punishment as actually never justified, per Deleuze, "The guilty party escapes in the moment punishment is applied to the body and reifies a different person." ( )

Etikatörténeti szempontból lenyűgöző és (remélhetőleg) megismételhetetlen pillanat lehetett, amikor Jaspers ’46 januárjában a heidelbergi egyetemen fellépett a katedrára, hogy filozófiai értelemben megvizsgálja a német bűnösség kérdését. Talán az első ilyen irányú törekvés volt – elképesztő ez a felelősség, nem is csoda, hogy nem tudott tökéletesen megfelelni neki. (Persze egy ilyen feladatba alighanem mindenkinek beletört volna a bicskája.) Jaspers kezdésnek elkülönít négy bűnfogalmat: büntetőjogit, politikait, morálisat és metafizikait, az elsőben és a harmadikban felmenti a németeket, mint nemzetet, a másodikban meg a negyedikben pedig elmarasztalja. Szóval salamoni döntést hoz. Itt elsősorban az nem tetszett, ahogy a németek morális ártatlanságát bizonyítja: arra hivatkozik, hogy morálisan nem ítélhető el azért valaki, mert nem áldozza fel az életét egy reménytelen ügyért. Na ja, de ha nem próbálja meg feláldozni az életét, akkor honnan tudja, hogy reménytelen? Na jó, talán máshogy beszélnék, ha ezeket a kérdéseket nekem kéne élesben megválaszolnom egy kemény diktatúrán belül*… Úgyhogy ugorjunk inkább.

Ennél jobban zavar, hogy Jaspers arra hivatkozik, a szövetségesek is részesek a bűnben, hisz nem akadályozták meg idejekorán Hitler gonosztetteit. Ezzel csak az a baj, hogy bár racionális értelemben valóban okosabb lett volna (talán) már ’38-ban odacsördíteni a náciknak, de az már korántsem egyértelmű, hogy morális értelemben is. Hiszen megfékezni a nácikat valószínűleg csak fegyveres erővel lehetett volna – vagyis minden bizonnyal (és többek között) olyan németek élete árán, akik (mint Jaspers leszögezi, és helyesen) kollektíve nem bűnösek Hitler tetteiben. Persze később erre úgy is sor került, de ha a háborút a szövetségesek kezdik – erkölcsi értelemben nem veszítenek többet, mint így? Mindenesetre nem könnyen megválaszolható kérdés.

Mindezzel együtt nagyon fontos könyv a kollektív bűnösség fogalmáról. Egy kísérlet, hogy egy nemzet újradefiniálja önmagát. Meg aztán Jaspers, ahogy azt az elején is leszögezi, nem tesz mást, mint párbeszédet indít. Nem kinyilatkoztat, hanem várja a reakciókat. És ebben az esetben aligha tehet többet**. Ezt a párbeszédet innentől kezdve másoknak kell folytatnia – nemcsak Németországban, de másutt is. „Hisz bűnösök vagyunk mi, akár a többi nép” – írta Radnóti ’44-ben a kollektív felelősségről, és amikor azt mondta: mi, nem azzal a csoporttal azonosította magát, akiknek „bűnei” miatt később lakolnia kellett. Ha egy nemzet meg akarja határozni magát, erényeit és eredményeit, gyarlóságait és hibáit egyként kell vizsgálnia. A torz, féloldalas önértékelésű nemzetek másokban keresik meg azokat a bűnöket, amiket önmagukban eltagadnak, és ez a történelmi álmoskönyv szerint semmi jót nem jelent.

(A kötet tartalmazza Hannah Arendt egy nagyon fontos cikkét a témában, valamint Csejtei Dezső és Juhász Anikó korrekt, értelmező tanulmányát.)

* Hannah Arendt erre jegyzi meg, hogy a XX. század nagy bűnözője a családapa, aki létbiztonság és a család érdekében megköti a maga kompromisszumait, és nem száll szembe a totális állammal, mi több: legitimálja azt.
** Más kérdés, hogy később elhagyta Németországot, és ezzel valamilyen szinten maga szakította meg a párbeszéd lehetőségét. ( )

Librería 6. Estante 1.

Es un buen primer acercamiento al problema de la culpa, que toma como escenario al holocausto y aprovecha para ser una apología del pueblo alemán, bien lograda para su momento, pero en perspectiva un tanto mártir y autocompasiva.
Pretende ser una fenomenología de la culpa, pero es un tanto laxa, al grado de que culpa y responsabilidad política parece utilizarse de manera indiferenciada (al menos en esta traducción).
Fundamental, en todo caso, para complementar una investigación filosófica del holocausto en torno al trabajo de Hannah Arendt. ( )

100 JAS 4