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A carregar... War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorismpor Douglas J. Feith
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Adira ao LibraryThing para descobrir se irá gostar deste livro. Ainda não há conversas na Discussão sobre este livro. I'm certainly not an apologist for the Bush Administration. Nor am I one of the rabid Bush-haters. I remember very clearly what the debate was on going to war against Iraq. Feith does too and retells it in detail. And in the process he reveals the hypocrisy of those who now oppose the war, but at the time of decision didn't, and demonstrates how the Bush Administration let its critics frame the debate. The old saw is, "He who wins the war, writes the history." Well, maybe not. Because President Bush has won this war, but he's still letting others write the history. Having just gotten this book, I haven't had time to read it but can already see that, unlike the typical "insider" memoir, it backs up its arguments with contemporary documents. (The author has posted all of the unclassified and declassified ones on-line to help readers evaluate his analyses.) The reviews in the Wall Street Journal and National Review make it clear that Mr. Feith has written an account that everyone who wants to think seriously about the war in Iraq and, more broadly, the War on Terror will have to read and digest. Update: Reading the book confirmed my favorable impression. For some comments, and a contrast with a lesser "insider's account", see http://stromata.typepad.com/stromata_blog/2008/05/feith-vs-mcclel.html
This book, an analytical description of a dysfunctional National Security Council and disloyal senior officials, will be studied for years by journalists, historians, and aspiring political appointees. Sharp insights are scattered through its more than 600 pages — which are structured as a careful legal brief, forcing the reader to sift for the many nuggets. Former undersecretary of defense Douglas Feith comes across as a serious policy wonk, both highly educated and dedicated to the proposition that the internal logic of a theory or policy position should persuade the reader and guide government. Not for him the breezy style of books where sources who remember conversations from years past slyly offer juicy gossip. Instead, half of the book is a convincing refutation of unfair allegations about the author. The other half presents a balanced analysis of policy debates about Iraq inside the administration between mid-2001 and mid-2004, including copious footnotes and copies of documents. Feith’s book brings the reader into the deliberative process to observe, as he notes early on, that “policy making often involves choosing to accept one set of likely problems over another.” On issue after issue — the quality and interpretation of prewar intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, the desired constitution of post-war Iraqi governance, Iraq-al-Qaeda/terrorist relations, and many others — Feith has laid out the most well-documented explanation of how decisions were made. Feith’s book is no less than a reference publication for the deconstruction of the myths and assertions promoted by those who either oppose or have become disenchanted with the Iraq invasion and, more broadly, the Bush counterattack on Islamic terror. [T]he best account to date of how the administration debated, decided, organized and executed its military responses to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. . . . Mr. Feith's book does not lack for criticism of how the administration handled itself or even, at times, of how he handled himself. But . . . most of the received wisdom about the dynamics of the first Bush term -- pitting "warmongering neocons" and democracy fantasists such as Mr. Feith against more sober-minded realists such as then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage -- is bunk, and demonstrably so.
Of all the players in the planning and evolution of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism, few were more integral--or more controversial--than Douglas Feith, the chief strategist on Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon policy team. A highly influential international policy analyst for more than a quarter century, Feith worked closely with Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Vice President Cheney, and President Bush in defining the U.S. response to the attacks of 9/11--from the successful war on Afghanistan to the more challenging invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. Now, in this candid and revealing memoir, Feith--a charter member of the neoconservative movement and an architect of the administration's preventive strategy in the war on terrorism--offers the most in-depth and authoritative account yet of the Pentagon's evolving stance during one of the most controversial eras of American history. Drawing upon a unique trove of documents and records, this extraordinary chronicle will put the reader in the room for scores of previously unreported senior-level meetings, showing how hundreds of critical decisions were made in defense of American interests during and after the crisis of 9/11--decisions both successful and controversial. Where journalists like Bob Woodward could only speculate, Feith is the first inside player to reveal the inner workings of the Pentagon, at a time when history hung in the balance.--From publisher description. Não foram encontradas descrições de bibliotecas. |
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Google Books — A carregar... GénerosSistema Decimal de Melvil (DDC)973.931History and Geography North America United States 1901- Bush Administration And Beyond George W. BushClassificação da Biblioteca do Congresso dos EUA (LCC)AvaliaçãoMédia:
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Feith is not necessarily defensive in his writing, but he is presenting HIS view and rationalizing them through his eyes. Clearly there was tension between the State Department and the Defense Department, and between CIA and Defense, and that reinforces the idea that the wars in Afghanistan, and especially Iraq, were not as well thought out and needed, nor necessarily based on the best information available. If Feith didn't use cherry-picked data in support of his views, he certainly used data which supported the position of the Administration, and especially the Dept of Defense. He maintains that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were well thought out, although admitting that plans could have been better and not everything worked out as hoped. Nonetheless, after several years, it's good to hear from one of the key men behind the scenes, and get an answer to the question "What Were They Thinking?" ( )