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Moon Lander: How We Developed the Apollo…
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Moon Lander: How We Developed the Apollo Lunar Module (edição 2001)

por Thomas J. Kelly

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1776152,859 (4.26)5
Chief engineer Thomas J. Kelly gives a firsthand account of designing, building, testing, and flying the Apollo lunar module. It was, he writes, "an aerospace engineer's dream job of the century." Kelly's account begins with the imaginative process of sketching solutions to a host of technical challenges with an emphasis on safety, reliability, and maintainability. He catalogs numerous test failures, including propulsion-system leaks, ascent-engine instability, stress corrosion of the aluminum alloy parts, and battery problems, as well as their fixes under the ever-present constraints of budget and schedule. He also recaptures the exhilaration of hearing Apollo 11's Neil Armstrong report that "The Eagle has landed," and the pride of having inadvertently provided a vital "lifeboat" for the crew of the disabled Apollo 13.… (mais)
Membro:lemontwist
Título:Moon Lander: How We Developed the Apollo Lunar Module
Autores:Thomas J. Kelly
Informação:Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press (2001), 288 pages
Coleções:Lidos mas não possuídos, Read in 2012 (inactive)
Avaliação:***
Etiquetas:science, TL, 2000s, NASA, Apollo

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Moon Lander por Thomas J. Kelly

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Fascinating story of some of the engineering and manufacturing work behind the moon landings. I think that this work is more interesting than the astronauts and moon landings themselves, though it is commonly overlooked because of its technical nature. Kelly brings it to life.

> sometimes I was there alone and could let my imagination fly ahead to the day when that very LM, that very square foot of cabin flooring where I was standing, would descend to the Moon’s alien surface in the final test of all our efforts and dreams. How I wished to be a stowaway in that tiny cabin! It was as close as I ever got to the Moon, but in my mind it was vivid and thrilling nonetheless.

> Soon after it was received at KSC, LM-1 was found to have widespread leakage in the propulsion and RCS systems. The people at Cape Kennedy quickly characterized Grumman’s first flight-worthy spacecraft that we had proudly, if tardily, shipped as a “piece of junk that leaked like a sieve.”

> Gentlemen, we have a serious problem. The problem is that Grumman believes the MIT guidance system is two orders of magnitude inferior to other available systems, and that the Apollo program is being jeopardized by this choice … Dave Hoag gave MIT’s rebuttal. Starting with Grumman’s number, 894 failures per million hours, he patiently showed how that number dropped as each incorrectly included or omitted set of data was corrected. … “Well,” he said, “I think this meeting has accomplished its purpose. Joe Gavin, is there any doubt in your mind that your people were wrong?” “None whatsoever. I’m sorry we gave everyone so much trouble.” Gavin was ashen-faced. MIT had blown Grumman’s analysis out the water, showing that we had not dug deeply enough to properly understand and interpret the GE reliability data. We left the meeting with our heads hung low, figuratively beating our breasts. This incident had a lasting negative effect on Grumman’s reputation on the Apollo program, and for a time it did not do my own personal reputation any good, either. Shea and others saw Grumman as a loose cannon meddling outside its jurisdiction—definitely not team players. They thought we could not be trusted and were particularly upset by what they saw as Grumman’s “holier-than-thou” attitude, ready to point an accusatory finger at the alleged transgressions of others. For years afterward we endured strained relations with MIT; not until we were jointly supporting flight missions with them did feelings improve. This incident reinforced NASA’s growing belief that Grumman required close oversight and constant detailed direction.

> in accordance with NASA’s thorough requirements, I observed a simple OCP to proof test the overhead crane before we entrusted it with the precious spacecraft. How rigid, by-the-numbers NASA is, I thought, insisting that we do this silly proof test when we know the overhead crane is routinely checked every six months. Fortunately I kept this thought to myself, so when the six-ton dead weight slowly slid back to the floor as the crane was trying to hoist it I did not have to explain to anyone. The crane was repaired and the proof test repeated—twice—and I silently praised NASA for its caution.

> NASA had posed a very broad requirement for reliability: each Apollo mission must provide .999 probability of crew safety (one in one thousand chance of fatality) and .99 probability of mission success (one in one hundred chance of aborting the mission). These overall probabilities had been apportioned by NASA to the individual elements making up the total mission, including the LM. We in turn had apportioned our total unreliability allowance (=1—p) among each of the LM systems and subsystems, resulting in allowable failure probabilities of one in ten thousand or less for each system. From a designer’s point of view these probabilities were not much help. In practical terms they could not be demonstrated because the allowable failure rates were so low that to prove them would require hundreds or even thousands of repetitive tests. Analyses, however, could be used to show relative failure rates of alternative system designs. The absolute value of such analyses was always suspect, but they would indicate the extent to which component redundancy or other system configuration changes would improve overall system reliability.

> After we had installed the instruments in three cockpits, a clever NASA inspector at Bethpage devised a new technique that was simple but effective in disclosing dirt particles trapped within the sealed case. He simply held the instrument on the workbench, glass face down, and shook and tapped it gently. Then, retaining the glass-down orientation, he lifted it up over his head and looked for dirt particles on the inside surface of the glass. If any at all were visible, the instrument had to be returned to its supplier to have the case opened, cleaned, and resealed. This improved inspection technique had never been thought of before, either by the instrument manufacturers or ourselves, and almost none of the instruments that had been delivered could pass it. For the manned flight spacecraft the new test was mandatory, so for LM-3, the cockpit of which was almost complete, we had to remove and replace all the instruments. ( )
1 vote breic | Jul 31, 2021 |
Definitely boring at times but this book is an outstanding look inside an engineering design process. I think all engineering students should read something like this to get a good feel for the scope of what our work can accomplish, and why it's important to follow design rules!! ( )
  lemontwist | Jul 11, 2012 |
Thomas Kelly was the project engineer for the Apollo Lunar Module, built by Grumman Aircraft at their Bethpage, New York, “Ironworks” between 1962 and 1970. Grumman developed and built fifteen LMs, six of which landed on the Moon. The craft is unique – the only manned spacecraft designed to land on an airless satellite, and the only manned spacecraft ever to have done so.

See rest of review here - http://spacebookspace.wordpress.com/2010/02/07/moon-lander-thomas-j-kelly/ ( )
1 vote iansales | Feb 12, 2010 |
Haven't finished it yet, but Moon Lander is a good intro to the thinking process of engineers: requirements analysis & definition, conceptual design, trade-offs, and re-thinking problems. It's also a helpful intro to system engineering.

It's technical enough to satisfy engineers, but not too technical for the general reader. Plus, it's a great study into the unique challenges and paradigm shifts invoved in designing a manned spacecraft purely for the space environment. ( )
  grvaughan | Jul 5, 2008 |
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Chief engineer Thomas J. Kelly gives a firsthand account of designing, building, testing, and flying the Apollo lunar module. It was, he writes, "an aerospace engineer's dream job of the century." Kelly's account begins with the imaginative process of sketching solutions to a host of technical challenges with an emphasis on safety, reliability, and maintainability. He catalogs numerous test failures, including propulsion-system leaks, ascent-engine instability, stress corrosion of the aluminum alloy parts, and battery problems, as well as their fixes under the ever-present constraints of budget and schedule. He also recaptures the exhilaration of hearing Apollo 11's Neil Armstrong report that "The Eagle has landed," and the pride of having inadvertently provided a vital "lifeboat" for the crew of the disabled Apollo 13.

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